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Losing Control: 
The Norm of Occupation in Eastern Europe during 
the First World War 
How does an occupier control an occupied country? In many accounts of 
occupations, control emanates from the interplay between the occupiers' poli-
cies and the population's accommodation or resistance to such policies. This 
immediately leads to a series of questions that guide research on occupation. 
What were the government's plans for a particular occupied territory? How 
did interest groups from the occupying country compete for resources in the 
occupied country? What were the views of those administering the occupa-
tion? As always, those who are supposed to be controlled play a role in this 
equation. What, if any, forms of resistance were open to the occupied? What 
motivated resistance? The quick equivalence made between an occupied 
country and a conquered country helps shape these questions. The occupying 
state can do what it pleases with the conquered country. Restraints are usually 
generated internally among the occupiers as well as from within the occupied 
territory. When handled in this way, occupation loses its dimension as an in-
ternational norm. The absence of this dimension derives from the experience 
of the Second World War, when occupation as an international norm was 
shattered and its international elements declared irrelevant. But what if we 
wind the clock back to before the Second World War? For historians of World 
War I, this requires that we proceed forward from the assumptions of 1914, 
not backward from the assumptions of 1945. Then the importance of the in-
ternational norm of occupation increases. That norm is impossible to under-
stand without recognizing the degree to which it was linked to the mainte-
nance of state sovereignty in Europe and the containment of war. Occupation 
sought to maintain the theoretical sovereignty of a defeated state. War con-
tainment in the nineteenth century was predicated on the clean divide be-
tween civilian and military spheres in war. If sovereignty was called into ques-
tion, occupation, and with it war containment, also came under pressure, 
leading to violence on the ground. Occupation as devised in the late nine-
teenth century applied to Europe alone and much of the colonial world was 
excluded. If we view occupation as an international norm with a precise mean-
ing in the pre-1914 world, we can place its transformation during the First 
World War in perspective. Given occupation's close connection to the world 
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of pre-1914 European sovereign states, it comes as no surprise that its 
unraveling in Europe began precisely where state sovereignty experienced its 
greatest crisis during the war. That place was Eastern Europe. 
But in order to understand the transformation of occupation, it does not 
suffice to recognize how abstract concepts might be linked and plot where 
those concepts collapsed. The collapse of occupation as a norm in Eastern 
Europe was a dynamic process subject to a range of contingencies that arose 
in the early years of the war and was intimately related to the crises experi-
enced by the oldest imperial sovereignties in the war: the Habsburg Empire 
and tsarist Russia. It was this wartime crisis of imperial sovereignty in 1914 
and 1915 that paved the way for the fall of occupation across Eastern Europe. 
It called fundamental assumptions with regard to occupation in the pre-1914 
world into question. This process accelerated after 1917 with the progressive 
and massive implosion of imperial Russian sovereignty. It did not unfold in 
the same way everywhere, and there were exceptions to the rule. Nonetheless, 
I believe that focusing on the broader process allows us to better situate oc-
cupation during the First World War within the history of occupation in the 
twentieth century. 
In this short article I would like to develop the outlines of a broader argu-
ment regarding the transformation of occupation and the expansion of vio-
lence during the First World War. First, in order to understand the dynamics 
at play in violence in the context of occupation we have to properly situate oc-
cupation as an international norm specific to the world of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. That norm should not be slotted into a broader 
history of human rights as has often been done with attempts to regulate war 
after the Franco-Prussian War. Rather, occupation should be connected to 
classic nineteenth-century norms such as sovereignty and war containment. It 
is helpful to think of these attempts to regulate war as expressions of norms as 
opposed to hard and fast laws. Too often, arguments regarding the 'breaking 
of international law' devolve into a laundry list of violations and remarks 
about the disregard for international law. Yet norms are far more robust than 
laws, and violations of norms do not render norms irrelevant. It is only when 
the norm appears to disappear completely and is not even referenced, that we 
witness a definitive break with it. Second, occupation became a fragile norm 
in Eastern Europe over the course of the war. The origins of that fragility lay 
in the initial violence of the war. The first year of the war in the East called the 
sovereignties of imperial Russia and the Habsburg Empire into question. This 
process was rooted in the empires themselves, but also in the contingent 
events of the war in these empires, and the policies devised for the occupied 
territories. The close links between sovereignty, war containment, and occu-
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pation meant that the faltering of one of these norms called the others into 
question. By the end of the war the nineteenth-century norm of occupation in 
Eastern Europe had been eroded. In turn, violence in the occupied territories 
became increasingly uncontained. Germany found itself an actor in this proc-
ess and was overtaken by it, even though it had avoided the crisis of sover-
eignty that struck the Habsburg Empire and imperial Russia. Leaving its ex-
pansive war aims to one side, until at least late 1916, Germany generally tried 
to stay within the boundaries of the Hague Conventions in places such as 
occupied Poland and Belgium. But gradually this approach was abandoned in 
favor of a new type of transformative occupation, which was often styled as an 
intervention. In such interventions, the German military, itself in a state of 
partial dissolution, became less capable of controlling violence, becoming a 
mere player in the violence in the occupied territory. The turn from the norm 
of occupation by 1918 signaled a complete reversal of the German stance at 
pre-war international legal conferences in defense of war containment and in 
favor of occupation. 
Occupation as a norm on the eve of war 
If we view occupation as a norm that assumed a particular form over the 
course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, our gaze is inevita-
bly drawn to the international legal conferences in the 30 years following the 
Franco-Prussian War. These conferences sought to establish a norm of occu-
pation that was commensurate with the standards of European conflict in the 
late nineteenth century. Such a norm ran the gauntlet of professional military 
interests and those of the emerging profession of international law. It was clear 
that the norm of occupation would be invoked in any conflict that involved 
one or more of the Great Powers. Before World War I, imperial Russia was at 
pains to show, for example, that it adhered to the norm of occupation in the 
Russo-Turkish War.1 As with all norms, this norm did not require absolute 
adherence in order to remain relevant. As studies in political science have 
shown, states transgress norms, but the power of a norm can be such that they 
1 Peter Holquist: The Russian Empire as Civilized State. International Law as Principle and 
Practice in Imperial Russia, 1874-1878, in: National Council for Eurasian and East Euro-
pean Research 2004, at: www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2004_818-06g_Holquist.pdf (last ac-
cessed on 4. 9. 2013); Eric Myles: 'Humanity', 'Civilization' and 'the International Com-
munity' in the Late Imperial Russian Mirror. Three Ideas 'Topical for Our Days: in: Jour-
nal of the History oflnternational Law 2 (2002), 310-334. 
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feel compelled to portray themselves as acting in accordance with that norm. 
Thus, a norm can be reinforced even when it is violated in practice. 2 
What were the specific features of the norm of occupation? One line of ar-
gument places it within a narrative of the progressive humanization of war. 
Such an argument emphasizes the Martens clause, which declared that ele-
ments of war and occupation not directly addressed by the Hague Conven-
tions remained under the dictates of the "principles of humanity and the civil-
ized conscience:' But as Antonio Cassese argues, the importance now attached 
to the Martens clause does not reflect the importance attributed to it at the 
Hague Conference of 1899. At that time it was considered- even by its author 
- a clever diplomatic trick to keep the conference from collapsing into dis-
agreement. 3 If we avoid a Whiggish perspective on law and occupation, we see 
just how much sovereignty and war containment shaped the norm of occupa-
tion in the late nineteenth century. Occupation sought to protect European 
state sovereignty by treating the occupying power as a 'trustee' for the depart-
ed sovereign government. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 used the term 
"usufructuary" to describe the occupier. The Hague Convention of 1900 de-
termined that the occupier was bound to respect existing laws insofar as they 
did not interfere with "military necessity" and was to avoid transforming the 
country it occupied. Local officials were to remain in their posts and obey the 
occupying authorities to ensure as little disruption as possible in the lives of 
the occupied.4 Armies could requisition supplies and continue to collect taxes 
in occupied countries in order to support the occupying forces. The norm of 
occupation attempted to reinforce the sovereignty of the occupied country 
and assumed that the lower levels of bureaucracy would continue to function 
in occupied countries. This meant that defeated countries had an incentive to 
accept defeat and hope for a more amenable deal at the peace table instead of 
choosing to continue what might be an ever more destructive conflict. 
Those who resisted an established occupation did not receive the protec-
tion of belligerent status and attempts to explicitly recognize resistance to oc-
2 The more historically inflected literature from political scientists offers an interesting ap-
proach for historians to consider. See for example Sarah Percy: Mercenaries. The History 
of a Norm in International Relations. Oxford 2007; Richard M. Price: The Chemical 
Weapons Taboo. Ithaca 1997; idem: A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, in: 
International Organization 1 (1995), 73-103; Jeffrey W Legro: Which Norms Matter? Re-
visiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism, in: International Organization 1 ( 1997), 31-63. 
3 Antonio Cassese: The Martens Clause. Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, in: European 
Journal ofinternational Law 1 (2000), 216. 
4 See the Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, 
at: http:/ /www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/135?0penDocument (last accessed on 4. 9. 2013). 
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cupation were rejected at the Hague Conference of 1899.5 Although delegates 
such as Fedor Martens realized that such uprisings might well occur and even 
considered them noble undertakings, they also recognized that such uprisings 
ran extreme risks and would probably be crushed by occupying armies. Yet, in 
line with the moderate liberalism of many international lawyers, such a defeat 
was seen as part of a nation's progressive development. This did not mean that 
resistance was legalized, however. German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian 
military delegates resolutely opposed the legalization of resistance to occupa-
tion and warned that such legalization could escalate violence. These argu-
ments followed the nineteenth-century tradition of contained conflict and 
clear distinctions between soldiers and civilians. A careful reading of the 
Hague discussions reveals that if any country at the conference wanted to de-
part from contained war in Europe, it was Belgium, not Germany. Certainly, 
within the German army, as Isabel Hull has argued, some believed war could 
no longer be contained by norms and was simply the playing out of unre-
strained force.6 But it was the Belgian delegate who rued the fact that the 
Hague Conventions separated civilians from conflict and de-legitimized patri-
otic resistance against an established occupation. 7 The question of when an 
occupation actually began or was made 'effective' further underscored a gen-
eral" consensus regarding the problem of legalizing resistance to an occupa-
tion. The reason why some countries wanted the moment of effective occupa-
tion pushed back as far as possible was that this allowed them to challenge an 
enemy farther into an invasion. In order to quickly extend their control over a 
territory, others wanted effective occupation to be relatively easy to achieve. 
This entire disagreement, however, revealed a much broader consensus as to 
the inadvisability of resistance to occupation and the importance of contain-
ing war in Europe. Both sides recognized that once an occupation was in 
force, resistance had to end. 
Seen from this perspective, occupation, in particular the way in which it 
both limited and allowed for violence, can also be understood as the product 
5 This was the clear implication of explicitly granting belligerent status to civilians who 
rose up to defend their country against invasion but behaved in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war enshrined in article 2 of the 1899 Hague Convention. See Article 1, 
Chapter 1, Article 2, Annex to the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/150?0pen 
Document, (last accessed on 4. 9. 2013). 
6 Isabel V. Hull: Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Impe-
rial Germany. Ithaca 2005, 123-125. 
7 Quoted from a speech by Auguste Beernaert in fames Scott (ed.): The Proceedings of the 
Hague Peace Conferences. The Conference of 1899 and 1907. New York 1921, 502-504. 
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of complex negotiations between two emerging professions in the late nine-
teenth century: the professional officer corps and the international legal pro-
fession.s War was the territory on which these professions staked their claims. 
Like many professional debates, this discussion strove to achieve workable 
solutions to the situations the contending professions were trying to regulate. 
The most explosive theme in the discussion was violence against civilians in 
war and occupation as well as the officer corps' concern that conscript armies 
might find themselves exposed to civilians who attacked soldiers with impu-
nity. In this respect, it should come as no surprise that representatives of the 
German officer corps, whose Prussian element had developed the model of of-
ficer professionalization, took the most aggressive stance in these negotiations. 
The solution to this professional face-off between the military and the inter-
nationallegal professions in the European context was a norm of occupation 
that limited violence and blocked the transformation of the sovereign state 
temporarily defeated in war.9 
From the crises of 1914 and 1915 to the demise of 
the norm of occupation 
This norm of occupation came under pressure from the very beginning of the 
war. That pressure resulted from the gradual loosening of control over vio-
lence in occupied territories and the moments prior to established occupa-
tions, when the rules governing belligerency were hazy at best. Furthermore, 
the fragility of the Habsburg and Russian armies led to a series of practices 
that undermined the distinction between soldier and civilian. Yet, for the 
Habsburg army and, to a lesser extent, the Russian army, the initial violence of 
this period, on their own territory and on the territories they occupied, was 
the violence of pre-1914 armies. That is to say, both armies sought to police 
the borders of violence in war and to resolutely suppress what they viewed as 
the unjustified interference of civilians in war or their subversion in occupa-
tion. Yet this policing was quite violent. It was often infused with fears of 'sub-
versive' ethnic and religious groups and it began to unhinge various sovereign 
claims in these regions. 
8 On the development of the profession of international law, see Martti Koskenniemi: The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960. Cam-
bridge 2002. 
9 Nehal Bhuta: The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, in: European Journal of 
International Law 4 (2005), 721-740. 
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The Habsburg and Russian armies were fragile forces when the war began. 
They were conscript armies managed by small professional officer corps. As 
with all professional officer corps, they asserted their dominance over the 
sphere of war based on claims to expert knowledge, but their armies were 
filled with conscripts, in which they had little confidence.lO The Habsburg 
army had not fought for 40 years and the Russian army's performance in the 
Russo-Japanese war raised troubling questions about the army's reliability. 
There were perpetual doubts within the officer corps as to whether these ar-
mies would actually function in the event of war. Contrary to the image of a 
rush to arms in 1914, the mobilization efforts of the Russian army were 
plagued by resistance in the countryside. This resistance was fueled by con-
cerns about the fairness of conscription and the abundant alcohol that flowed 
before conscripts departed for their mobilization depots.l 1 By mid-1915, the 
Russian army lacked officers to control the huge influx of territorial recruits 
(opolcheniye), who had been called up to replace the losses of the previous ten 
months.l2 As late as mid-1917, the Habsburg Army High Command (Armee-
oberkommando, AOK) was concerned that the officer corps could not control 
the soldiers without the authorization to tie them up in public as punishment 
for infractions of military regulations. Such concerns about the reliability of 
the mass of soldiers, however, did not lead to curtailments of the armies' 
operational goals. The armies were faced with a punishing set of tasks in 1914. 
For example, in August 1914 the Habsburg Fifth Army was directed to attack 
eastwards into Serbia, traversing deep river gorges and mountainous terrain 
in sweltering heat with inadequate equipment. The soldiers could not cope in 
such conditions. When the Fifth Army encountered a partially uniformed 
Serb Third Levy, panic broke out not only among the soldiers, but also among 
the officers. Conscripts who had been pushed beyond their limits believed 
that civilians were participating in combat and, encouraged by their officers, 
they lashed out violently. The Habsburg army was primed to police the bound-
aries between soldiers and civilians. As early as July 1914 the army reached 
the conclusion that Serb guerrillas - or Komitadjis, as the army frequently 
called them - were "outside international law:' They were to be "completely 
10 The template for these officer corps, at least regarding their professionalization, remained 
the German officer corps. See Michael Geyer: The Past as Future. The German Officer 
Corps as Profession, in: Konrad Jarausch/Geoffrey Cocks (eds.): German Professions. 
1800-1950. Oxford 1990, 183-212. 
11 Joshua Sanborn: The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation. A 
Reexamination, in: Slavic Review 2 (2000), 267-289. 
12 Norman Stone: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. New York 1975, 166. 
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wiped out:'13 The army also availed itself of a wide-ranging and fearsome mil-
itary legal arsenal in order to handle perceived transgressions of this boundary. 
But even this was, at times, not enough. Thus, when the Habsburg army in-
vaded Serbia in late August, it went on a fear-induced rampage through north-
western Serbia in particular, killing 3,000 civilians, convinced that the Serb 
army and state had deliberately enlisted civilians to fight against the invading 
Habsburg army. Habsburg officers repeatedly stressed that the Serb state and 
army were intentionally violating international law. The commander of the 
Fifth Army, General Liborius Frank, declared that "the brutal, deceitful actions 
of the Serb military and Serb population against our troops [ ... ) violated every 
norm of war and all laws of humanitY:'14 
In addition to fears about civilian participation in war, the Habsburg and 
Russian armies faced a series of almost unremitting military disasters in the 
first year of the war. Such disasters lead us into the realm of classic military 
history, but before we immediately discount it, we would do well to remember 
the size and scale of the losses involved. Both armies suffered setbacks so 
severe over the course of this year that they could not but call the state's sover-
eign claims into question. In this respect, the Habsburg and Russian armies 
went through a far longer period of sustained heavy casualties than the armies 
on the Western front, whose war of movement had ended by late fall 1914. 
The Habsburg army's own history claims that the army was a "militia'' army 
by late 1914.15 Both armies lost many experienced line officers and non-com-
missioned officers, resulting in critical shortages of leaders at the front. With 
Italy's entry into the war in May 1915, the Habsburg army faced a three-front 
war. If we take the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow and the Great Retreat together, 
the Russian army suffered over one million casualties in a little over four 
months. 16 This level of loss in such a concentrated period of time was as-
tounding. Moreover, one can only imagine what it must have been like to live 
in areas that witnessed 800 000 casualties in a period of a couple months in 
the Carpathian winter campaign of early 1915P The defeats suffered in these 
areas were experienced on the ground as shocks. In Galicia, for example, a 
13 2. Armee, Oskar von Hranilovic: Ober Wesen, Ausriistung und Kampfesart der Komit-
adschis. July 1914, Ostereichisches Staatsarchiv Wien (OStA), Kriegsarchiv (KA), NFA, 
Box2. 
14 6. Armee, 5. AOK to the War Ministry, AOK, and 6. A OK. Op. No. 403/20, 26 August 
1914, 0StA KA, NFA, Box 13. 
IS Edmund Glaise von Horstenau eta!. (eds.): Osterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, 1914-1918. 
Wien 1930. 
16 Richard DiNardo: Breakthrough. The Gorlice-Tarn6w Campaign, 1915. Santa Barbara 
2010. 
17 Graydon Tunstall: Blood on the Snow. The Carpathian Winter War of 1915. Lawrence 2010. 
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Jewish supporter of the Habsburg Monarchy asserted that "with the appear-
ance of the Cossacks, the aura of invincibility, which the army as a suprana-
tional force and the monarchy as a whole had for many Galician Jews was lost, 
and with it the belief in the Monarchy as a whole:'18 
Such defeats did not dampen efforts by the Habsburg and Russian armies to 
assert their control over areas such as Galicia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Poland. Attempts by both armies to control these areas had the potential to 
further destabilize them and the empires that ruled them. Military techniques 
used to assert control in areas near the front bled over into occupation prac-
tices in Galicia and Serbia. The Habsburg army relied heavily on military law 
to deal with the slightest civilian disturbance near frontline areas and, increas-
ingly, at home. In a highly retributive military legal system, the rear was to be 
brought into line with the war and kept in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the 
army. Of course, this was highly problematic, as the task of policing civilian 
society in areas near the front quickly overstretched the capacities of the 
Habsburg military legal system. An uncertain army now waded into the high-
ly contentious waters of denunciation, further undermining the broader 
claims of the Habsburg state to legal impartiality. Moreover, the army emascu-
lated the Habsburg state administration in this process, creating the percep-
tion that it was no longer capable of representing the state's longstanding 
claims to impartiality and equal justice. This process reached its institutional 
climax in late March 1915 after the fall of Przemysl with war against Italy 
looming. At this point, the army was able to secure a summary form of mar-
tiallaw (Standrecht) for all army operational zones, which now covered about 
a third of the empire, thereby eliminating an emergency system of justice 
where the death penalty was the only possible sentence for the accused. The 
imposition of military law also extended to occupied territories, undermining 
the claims by the Habsburg army that it was operating within the norm of 
occupation in places such as army-occupied Serbia. The civilian population 
there was exposed to the full force of Habsburg military law and Standrecht. 
This practice was unheard of. No one at the Brussels or Hague conferences 
had ever envisioned that an entire occupied population would be subjected to 
military law in such a routine manner. Moreover, in debates on Habsburg mil-
itary law prior to the war, army lawyers had argued that military law could not 
approximate civilian law because of the need for discipline within a military 
organization. Against that background, the enforcement of military law in 
wartime Serbia appears even more out of bounds. In practice, this meant that 
18 Frank M. Schuster: Zwischen allen Fronten. Osteuropaische Juden wahrend des Ersten 
Weltkrieges, 1914-1919. Koln 2004, 128. 
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Serbian civilians could be tried for lese-majesty (Majestiitsbeleidigung) under 
martial law and executed for such offenses, as in Sabac in 1916.19 
The Russian army felt similarly uncertain, although in this case uncertainty 
was even more closely connected to ideas about ethnic unreliability in the bor-
derlands of the empire. As in the Habsburg Empire, these ideas of unreliability 
bled into army-run occupations. Like the Habsburg army, the Russian army 
was able to secure wide-ranging powers in areas near the front. It targeted Jews 
and Germans near the border and in occupied areas as groups that allegedly 
supported widespread spying and undermined military operations. The same 
sense of vulnerability that lay behind this search for traitors also led the army 
to exceed the limits of occupation law when it came to coercive measures in 
occupied areas. 2° For the Russian army, assessments of the reliability of ethnic 
groups had been part and parcel of universal conscription since its introduc-
tion in the 1870s.21 When it came to the war, however, these notions of ethnic 
reliability introduced more disorder in the regions where the Russian army 
fought and, in turn, made the war even more difficult to control. Army com-
manders such as Nikolai Ianushkevich were deeply anti-Semitic and described 
as "obsessed with the idea of spies and spying" by suspect groups.22 The norm 
of occupation made wide-ranging concessions for military necessity, and for 
the Russian army, that military necessity demanded heightened surveillance 
and targeting of Jewish communities. These practices had a long history in 
Russian colonial military practice, but they were also common in situations 
where a Russian army unit believed it had been betrayed or even fired upon by 
local civilians.23 Yet it was equally clear that the targeting of suspect ethnic and 
19 See Gericht des Kreiskommandos Sabac to the AOK. 28 April1916, OStA KA, NFA, AOK-
Quartiermeister-Abteilung (Qu.Abt.), Box 2389; Gericht des Kreiskommandos Sabac to 
the AOK. 1 May 1916, OStA KA, NFA, AOK-Qu.Abt., Box 2389; Gericht des Kreiskom-
mandos Sabac to the AOK. 5 May 1916, OStA KA, NFA, AOK-Qu.Abt., Box 2389. 
20 Peter Holquist: Les violences de l'armee russe a l'encontre des juifs en 1915. Causes et 
limites, in: John Horne (ed.) : Vers laguerre totale. Le tournant de 1914-1915. Paris 2010, 
191-219; idem: The Role of Personality in the First (1914-1915) Russian Occupation of 
Galicia and Bukovina, in: John Klier (ed.): Anti-Jewish Violence. Rethinking the Pogrom 
in East European History. Bloomington 2011, 52-73; Alexander V. Prusin: Nationalizing a 
Borderland. War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914-1920. Tusca-
loosa 2005; see also the contribution by jochen Bohler to this volume. 
21 Werner Benecke: Militar, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich. Die Wehrpflicht in 
Russland 1874-1914. Paderborn 2006. 
22 Eric Lohr: The Russian Army and the Jews. Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence 
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religious communities operated at the edge of the norm of occupation, moving 
into the realm of those colonial practices of military control that the norm of 
occupation eschewed. On the ground, they certainly did little to contain vio-
lence and actually encouraged it. In the context of the Great Retreat in 1915, 
there was extensive hostage-taking ofJews in areas such as occupied Galicia, as 
well as Russia proper. As the army careened out of control, motives other than 
security began to play a role in the treatment of Jews. Robbery and plundering 
featured increasingly in army attacks on Jewish communities. A policy designed 
to secure the Russian army's control of occupied areas and areas near the front 
actually destabilized these areas, making them harder to control and weakening 
Russian claims to sovereignty there. Moreover, the charges of treason and spy-
ing thrown around by the army and largely directed against suspect ethnic and 
religious groups also backfired on elements of the multinational tsarist state; 
the Russian public increasingly believed that key figures all the way up to the 
tsarina were actually German spies.24 This further undermined tsarist authority. 
In addition, as Peter Gatrell has argued, the wave of refugees triggered by 
events such as the Great Retreat and the army's determination to protect itself 
against suspect groups such as the Jews rolled the instability of the front back 
into the Russian interior.25 
Apart from their internal repercussions, these policies also had repercus-
sions for the pre-1914 norm of occupation. Army violence, even when it was 
allegedly aimed at maintaining the solider/civilian divide, only increased dis-
order in these regions. In turn, they became more difficult, not easier, for 
armies to control. The formal sovereignty of the state in such areas and the 
claims that came with it were undercut. Ironically, the sovereign claims of the 
state in these areas became more extreme and more contested than ever be-
fore. 26 In the Russian Empire, this process was particularly advanced, because 
the war undermined the sovereign claims of the state in a region where those 
claims were, according to Jorg Baberowski, already weak to begin with. This 
further undermined occupation as a norm because sovereignty was such a key 
element of that norm.27 The pre-1914 norm of occupation relied heavily on 
24 William C. Fuller: The Foe Within. Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia. 
Ithaca 2006. 
25 Peter Gatrell: A Whole Empire Walking. Refugees in Russia during World War I. Bloom-
ington 1999. 
26 On conceiving sovereignty as a series of claims, see james f. Sheehan: The Problem of 
Sovereignty in European History, in: The American Historical Review 1 (2006), 1-15. 
27 ]iirg Baberowski: Kriege in staatsfernen Raumen. Russland und die Sowjetunion 1905-
1950, in: Dietrich Beyrau/Michael Hochgeschwender/Dieter Langewiesche (eds.) : For-
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the continued functioning of a local administration, but in many cases local 
adininistrations had either completely disappeared or had been completely 
marginalized by national armies prior to occupation. 28 If sovereignty was 
central to the pre-1914 norm of occupation, could such norms still be relevant 
when the sovereign claims of the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire 
were being increasingly eroded? 
From here, events took one or other of two paths. The first further rein-
forced the norm of occupation and backed away from extensive violence. The 
leaders of the Habsburg Empire chose to follow this path. They made a des-
perate attempt to restore the empire's claims to sovereignty both internation-
ally and domestically. This attempt can only be sketched out in a cursory fash-
ion here. It led, however, to a recall of the Parliament (Reichsrat) in the Aus-
trian half of the empire, a series of secret peace feelers in the Sixtus mission, 
an attempt to impress upon Germany the pressures at play in the empire and 
ultimately unsuccessful efforts to curb the Third Supreme Command's dra-
matic expansion of the war. It also resulted in the curtailment of the army's 
interventions in domestic politics and its application of military law to civil-
ians. Occupation regimes, especially that in Serbia, were also moved back into 
the norm of occupation. For Serbia, this meant that Standrecht, the emergency 
system of justice administered by the army, was gradually abandoned. More-
over, the occupation regime in Serbia found that proposals for forced labor 
programs and the right to kill suspected guerrillas or Komitadjis were struck 
down by the AOK because they conflicted with the pre-1914 norm of occupa-
tion. The legal officer at the Army High Command noted that these proposals 
by the occupation regime in Serbia were unacceptable because "in the occupa-
tion administration, international law must be upheld:'29 It is well known that 
this attempt to bolster Habsburg sovereignty failed for a variety of reasons. 
Calling back the Parliament seemed to embolden nationalist groups burning 
with resentment at their treatment at the hands of the army since 1914. The 
growing prominence of the United States in world politics meant that soundings 
in the direction of nineteenth-century great power politics and restraint went 
unnoticed or even backfired. Ultimately, no one would notice an attempted, 
28 On the eclipsing of civilian authorities by military authorities in these empires, see Mark 
Mazower: Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century, in: The American Historical 
Review 4 (2002), 1175. 
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leistungen, gesetzliche Einfiihrung in Serbien". 9 July 1917, OStA KA, NFA, Box 2458; 
AOK-Qu.Abt., M.V.S. Heranziehung der Beviilkerung zur Dienstleistung nach §52 der 
Haager Landkriegsordnung. 15 July 1917, OStA KA, NFA, Box 2459. 
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hesitant return to the norm of occupation. Occupation could not be manipu-
lated in a way that bolstered Habsburg sovereignty. 
If the Habsburg Empire met its crisis of sovereignty with an attempt to reas-
sert its sovereign claims, re-contain conflict, and re-anchor itself in pre-1914 
norms, the tsarist Empire, the Provisional Government, and their successors 
went even deeper into the war. The collapse of authority across Russia gath-
ered pace in 1917. This also led to extensive surveillance and control, which 
although rooted in the tsarist regime's own war, were radically expanded dur-
ing the Russian Civil War. This story needs no retelling here as it has already 
been ably recounted by historians such as Peter Holquist, Peter Gatrell, and 
Orlando Figes to name a few. However, its implications for the norm of occu-
pation have often been neglected.30 The conflict itself became de-centered 
and a story of wars within wars as authority collapsed. This meant a departure 
from the pre-1914 norm of occupation by 1918. The assumptions of sover-
eignty and war containment in the pre-1914 norm of occupation became in-
creasingly irrelevant. Control of occupied territories was bitterly contested 
and occupation regimes found themselves searching for new forms of control. 
Of course, the colonial model that Europe had exported across the world pre-
sented itself as an option. Yet now this model had to be deployed in a far more 
violent and contested situation under conditions of extreme privation. The 
entire pre-1914 international system, which undergirded the norm of occupa-
tion, had lost all relevance under these circumstances. While the leadership of 
the Habsburg Empire attempted to move back into this system with certain 
consequences for some of its occupied territories, across the western border-
lands of Russia an attitude of hardened realism was beginning to shape con-
flict. Given such ruthless realism, the niceties of pre-1914 occupation praxis 
appeared dangerously nai:ve. Occupation was often abandoned altogether, and 
interventions came to the fore. 
German control in the East 
Germany's position was arguably stranger in this context than that of any 
other power. At the two Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, Germany had 
portrayed itself as the arch-occupier and was considered by other participat-
ing countries as such. It had encouraged the creation of a norm of occupa-
30 Orlando Figes: A People's Tragedy. The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924. New York 1996; 
Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking; Peter Holquist: Making War, Forging Revolution. Rus-
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tion structured around war containment and sovereignty, battering down, 
often brutally, the arguments of delegates from countries such as Belgium. As 
Alan Kramer, John Horne, and Laura Engelstein have shown, Germany was 
responsible for many atrocities in the frenzied initial months of the war.31 
But we would be better advised to view this violence alongside that of the 
Austro-Hungarian army or the Russian army in East Prussia in the summer 
of 1914. This was part of a frenzied and overheated attempt to maintain the 
divide between soldier and civilian in the context of an overly ambitious 
timetable for the invasion of Belgium and France, which led ultimately to 
transgressions of the norms of war. 32 Yet Germany did not undergo the same 
crisis of sovereignty experienced by the Habsburg and Russian Empires in 
the first year of the war. In fact, German occupations initially seemed to hew 
to international norms of occupation. Despite the immediate chaos of the 
Great Retreat, in Poland, Germany instituted a traditional occupation ad-
ministration largely in line with 1914 conceptions of occupation.33 That is 
not to say that right-wing German pressure groups such as the Eastern 
Marches League did not envision something far more transformative for Po-
land. Yet the Governor-General of Poland Hans Hartwig von Beseler sought 
to "maintain calm and order with severity and fairness:' This was all very 
much in line with the Hague Conventions. The German administrative state 
also made an appearance in occupied Poland, infringing on Russian sover-
eignty there. Various Prussian municipal ordnances were introduced and ele-
ments of municipal government were reorganized. 34 Despite this, Germany 
kept many Russian laws on the books, including those concerning Jews. This 
was consistent with the aim of the norm of occupation to bolster the sover-
31 John Horne/Alan Kramer: German Atrocities, 1914. A History of Denial. New Haven 
2001; Laura Engelstein: "A Belgium of Our Own". The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 
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ing War, in: idem (ed.): War and Terror in Contemporary Perspective. Washington 2003, 
52-54. 
33 At least until 1916, when the demands of German industrial groups for foreign labor 
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Belgium, the German army did rely heavily on the Belgian municipal bureaucracy, in line 
with the Hague Convention. See Sophie de Schaepdrijver: La Belgique et Ia Premiere 
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eignty of the departed state.35 From the perspective of the international Jew-
ish community, the German army represented lawfulness and the Russian 
army represented arbitrary rule during the war. 36 
But after the collapse of Russian imperial sovereignty, the basis for the pre-
1914 norm of occupation became desperately fragile. The pre-1914 norm of 
occupation had envisioned the containment of conflict in an occupied terri-
tory and conflict intensified in its absence. As Vejas Liulevicius has shown, 
Germany's actions in the East in 1917 and 1918 increasingly tended towards 
more ambitious attempts to control occupied territories through 'movement 
policy' (Verkehrspolitik). A good deal of scholarship has examined the cultural 
perceptions that fueled such policies, but much of this scholarship pays little 
attention to the international context that shaped the wars in which such poli-
cies were implemented. Such ambitious efforts to control territories and peo-
ples in the East and the violence that often attended them were only possible 
because the categories that had previously applied to occupation had become 
irrelevant. Despite their attempts to hew to the pre-1914 norm of occupation 
earlier in the war, the German state and army increasingly turned away from 
that norm. Occupation, with its restrictions on violence and transformation, 
did not seem to apply to the East anymore and it did not offer Germany the 
same opportunities. In the aftermath of the Great Retreat, it was already ar-
gued in German governmental circles that the severity of Russian scorched 
earth policies deprived Russia of legal title to the territory it had abandoned in 
the summer of 1915.37 Such arguments, which undercut the entire pre-1914 
norm of occupation, did not take immediate hold, but by 1918 it was clear 
that the norm of occupation was on the wane. Most German 'occupations' on 
former Russian territory in 1918 were perceived as interventions on behalf of 
subordinate, 'independent' governments. Germany now conducted increas-
ingly intense, small-scale wars in countries with which it was actually at peace 
from an international legal perspective. Thus, Lithuania was transformed into 
a quasi-independent state ruled in actual fact by Ober Ost. Similarly, Ukraine 
did not have a German occupation regime, but the German army, along with 
the Habsburg army, intervened on behalf of the Ukrainian Central Council 
(Rada). General Wilhelm Groener, the chief of staff of the German interven-
tion force in Ukraine, found this to be an entirely new situation. Groener not-
35 Carole Fink: Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and Interna-
tional Minority Protection, 1878-1938. Cambridge 2004. 
36 Report Nr. 2 from the Jewish Conjoint Committee, 27. 7. 1915, Institute for Jewish Research 
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ed that there was no "proper occupation" in Ukraine. The German army, he 
explained, had barely enough force to cover the entire country and could only 
be described as a "thin net:' Meanwhile, the collapse of the tsarist state made 
the norm of occupation and its strictures about maintaining local administra-
tions seem irrelevant. As Groener observed, the local administration was no 
longer to be found as the tsarist one had been "destroyed."38 This is not to 
discount German perceptions of the 'foreignness' of the East, but simply to 
argue that the absence of a local administration - the key to governing an oc-
cupied territory according to pre-1914 norms- was not a pure fantasy stem-
ming from cultural images of the East in the German imagination. Even the 
Habsburg Empire found itself drawn away from the pre-1914 norm of occu-
pation in places such as Ukraine. Like the Germans, Habsburg officers and 
diplomats found Ukraine in a state of disarray, with little evidence of the pre-
1914 norms of occupation. "Every part of the state apparatus is destroyed; 
complete anarchy reigns;' reported a Habsburg official in Kiev, "there is no 
administration in the countryside:•39 
The absence of occupation meant that the entire logic of war containment 
was undermined. It is ironic that the moment when visions of German con-
trol in the East seemed most acute coincided with a time when such control 
was beyond the Germans' reach. In the aftermath of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin ar-
gued that the Germans would find it more difficult to control territory in the 
East and would have to station even more soldiers there. The Germans simply 
did not understand the nature of the war being fought there, he explained.40 
Instead of leading an occupation as the pre-1914 norm had envisioned, the 
German army became one of many armed groups in the territories where it 
intervened in the East. One German unit executed approximately 2,000 cap-
tured Bolsheviks near Taganrog after being attacked in mid-1918. This inci-
dent bore all the hallmarks of uncontained conflict. The Germans involved in 
this atrocity believed that the conflict lay outside the standard rules of war-
fare. Moreover, the German unit was characterized by a dangerous mix of local 
superiority and broader insecurity.41 As this brutal incident shows, the German 
38 Wilhelm Groener: Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg. Gottingen 1957, 
383-398. 
39 Auszug aus dem Bericht eines Vertreters der k. u.k. Mission in K.iew, 10. 3.1918, in: 
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army was a player in the violence that accompanied its intervention in Russia, 
but it can more accurately be viewed as one of many "warlords" in Russia.42 
The German army was eventually superseded by the Freikorps, a paramilitary 
organization that was much better equipped to deal with the war in the East 
in 1919. As historians such as Klaus Theweleit, Vejas Liulevicius, and most 
recently, Annemarie Sammartino have demonstrated, the Freikorps did not 
see itself as a classical military organization.43 Atrocities and violence as self-
expression now dominated the scene. The line between soldiers and civilians 
was increasingly blurred. Moreover, references to the world of the pre-1914 
norm of occupation disappeared. It was no longer necessary to slot the exer-
tion of force in a foreign country into this old norm. Violence had an entirely 
new logic and the international norms that had shaped war in 1914 were 
irrelevant. It was purely a matter of maintaining influence and exerting force 
within these territories, without any constraints on the violence that could be 
brought to bear in these situations. 
Conclusions 
As occupation disappeared across Eastern Europe in 1918, the Allied and 
Associated Powers began planning the occupation of the Rhineland. Marshal 
Ferdinand Foch referred to the Hague Conventions and the pre-1914 norm of 
occupation as the basis for Allied rule in the Rhineland. These were not emp-
ty words and the extent to which the Allies attempted to adhere to this norm 
in their occupation of the Rhineland was striking.44 Well into the interwar 
years, a directive went out to Belgian civil servants that in the event of enemy 
occupation, "they will be allowed to take a formal and written engagement to 
continue to exercise conscientiously and loyally their function and undertake 
nothing, nor omit anything which might be harmful to the enemy administra-
tion of occupied territorY:'45 Such moments, which appear to be in line with 
42 Joshua Sanborn: The Genesis of Russian Warlordism. Violence and Governance during 
the First World War and the Civil War, in: Contemporary European History 3 (2010), 
195- 213. 
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the pre-1914 norm of occupation, can only raise questions in the light of 
Eastern Europe's experience of occupation in the latter years of the First World 
War. 
The persistence of the pre-1914 norm of occupation in the West coupled 
with its fragility in the East should be understood as part of two broader 
trends in post-World War I European history. First, we can place it within the 
progressive limitation of sovereignty in Eastern Europe over the first half of 
the twentieth century. From this perspective, the interventions across Eastern 
Europe in the latter part of the war, themselves brought on by the way in 
which occupation had been undermined, can be linked to the League of 
Nations' Minorities Treaties. Both operated based on assumptions of limited 
Eastern European sovereignty. These treaties sought to create an international 
structure of limited sovereignty and humanitarian norms across Eastern Eu-
rope (excluding the Soviet Union of course) and were deeply resented by 
countries such as Poland.46 In the absence of imperial sovereignties, this new 
international structure for the region separated sovereignty in the East from 
sovereignty in the West. In essence, this can be read as one of the interna-
tional responses to the uncontained violence that accompanied the demise of 
occupation in the latter years of the war. The fragility of sovereignty in East-
ern Europe after 1916 persisted into the Second World War, when it was com-
pletely eviscerated in many countries.47 This laid the foundation for sub-
sequent transformative occupations in the region taken over by the National 
Socialists and the Soviet Union. Second, the shift away from the pre-1914 
norm of occupation in Eastern Europe signaled a moment when Eastern Eu-
rope became more like the rest of the world, with the German intervention in 
a place like Ukraine in 1918 representing a more chaotic version of the British 
attempt to create a limited sovereignty with special protection of British secu-
rity interests in a place like Iraq in 1932.48 From this perspective, the presence 
of empires in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe brought that region back 
into the realm of European 'civilization; at least with regard to international 
affairs.49 Thus Eastern Europe was not only a cultural creation of the Enlight-
46 Fink, Defending the Rights. 
47 For an example of the persistence of sovereignty and small states in Eastern Europe, see 
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enment, but also an international creation of the First World War in which the 
fall of sovereignty and the collapse of occupation played a central role. 
Of course, this all looks quite different from the world of 1914, with large 
portions of Eastern Europe anchored in the norm of occupation. In this sense, 
we can look more broadly through the lens of occupation to see how the First 
World War created an international divide between Eastern and Western Eu-
rope, which had been absent at the beginning of the war. That this divide 
would be predicated on a radical reversal of the logic of occupation, a reversal 
that paved the way for an expansion of violence as opposed to its contain-
ment, was the most tragic part of occupation's fragility in this part of the 
world. 
